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THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT OF 1933 
AND THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: THE 
CAUSE OF THE DISCONNECT OF MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTING FROM REALITY 
by 
Richard Vangermeersch, University of Rhode Island 
C. J. McNair, Babson College 
Prior to 1933 , accounting literature 
about capacity expressed great concern with 
realistic, or engineering-based, accounting. 
Dur ing eight years of working on a series of 
projects on accounting for capacity, the writ-
ers observed that a breakaway from realistic 
account ing for capacity occurred about 
1933. McNair believes that this was the 
great disconnect that ult imately led to the 
decay of management accounting unti l its 
revival in the mid 1980's. Vangermeersch, 
who had conferred with Tom Johnson on this 
matter dur ing the wri t ing of Relevance Lost: 
The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting, 
believes that the disconnect was probably 
caused by the rise of accounting standardiza-
tion due to the Truth and Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934. However, no hard evidence 
of the role of the S.E.C. in regards to man-
agement accounting was ever found. Thus , 
Vangermeersch had little to prove or dis-
prove McNair 's disconnect theory. 
W h i l e researching the subject of 
"Uniform Accoun t ing System" for The 
History of Accounting: An International 
Encyclopedia, Vangermeersch noted that a 
general belief exists tha t the Na t iona l 
Recovery Administrat ion (NRA) failed to 
succeed in its accounting efforts, especially 
on the issue of selling below costs. For exam-
ple, Charles F. Ross commented in NRA 
Economic Planning (1937-1971): "As a mem-
ber of the N R A staff once remarked, 'If the 
N R A had only adopted price fixing through 
cost formulas in all codes, all the unem-
ployed would have been needed to check 
compliance' " (p.276). 
Vangermeersch's research which sug-
gests that perhaps N R A codes represented 
McNair 's great disconnect point has led both 
to research the theory. The FDR Library was 
visited and numerous books on the Nat ional 
Indus t r ia l Recovery Act ( N I R A ) , the 
National Recovery Adminis trat ion, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (FDR), the N e w Deal, and 
H u g h S. Johnson—the first director of the 
N R A — w e r e studied. Numerous discussions 
of the disconnect theory have been held, and 
it has been presented at many conferences 
inc lud ing: the 1995 Th i rd Manager ia l 
Control System Symposium in London; the 
1996 Seventh Wor ld Congress of 
Accoun t ing His tor ians in K i n g s t o n , 
Onta r io ; and the 1996 Amer ican 
Accounting Association meet ing in Chicago. 
The writers realize that their theory is 
not amenable to the very high standard of 
proof needed for an academic journal. They 
realize that there was no deliberate discon-
nect of management accounting from engi-
neering realism taken by H u g h Johnson and 
the N R A , nor do they th ink that FDR had 
an inkling of the effect the N I R A would 
have on management accounting. However, 
the writers are convinced that they can offer 
a chronology of events that certainly offers 
significant support for their theory. W h a t 
remains is a formal venue for it. The writers 
would like to offer to the readers of the 
Accounting Historians Notebook a chance to 
debate in wri t ing the topic, much as the 
point/counterpoint feature recently initiated 
by Wanda Wallace in Issues in Accounting 
Education. 
The N R A was established to stop the 
downward wage/price spiral of the early 
1930s. Whereas the War Industries Board 
(WIB) used "full cost p lus" pr ic ing to 
encourage a massive use of capacity, the N R A 
used "full cost plus" pricing at a very low 
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level of production. Wages were increased, in 
the hope of stimulating demand so that 
prices would stabilize. In order to determine 
full cost, most of the countless industry codes 
included a relatively uniform cost system 
based on expected, not ideal, capacity. 
Pricing below cost was an anathema. 
However, as already noted, this provision was 
truly unenforceable. 
Like most ideas, the NIRA and NRA 
had definite antecedents. Many historians 
agree that the NRA sprang from the WIB 
founded during the U. S. participation in 
World War I. It is interesting to note that: 
FDR was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
from 1913-1921; Bernard Baruch headed 
the WIB and General Hugh Johnson was 
assigned to the WIB: Robert H. 
Montgomery played an important role with 
Baruch at the WIB and later at the NRA; 
Hugh Johnson worked for Baruch after the 
war; and FDR appointed Johnson head of the 
NRA in 1933. 
The men that Baruch led in the WIB 
met annually and remained in contact with 
each other. In 1931, they were instrumental 
at forming through Congress the War 
Policies Commission with Baruch, Johnson, 
and Montgomery back together formally. 
The NRA was set to go immediately when 
the NIRA passed in 1933 and probably 
never did any U. S. federal agency get going 
so quickly. The NRA could not maintain its 
quick and popular start and soon experi-
enced the difficulties of FDR, Johnson, and 
the NRA micromanaging trivia. R. H. 
Montgomery quickly got off the boat (really 
a sinking ship). Mussolini was not sure that 
the NRA would achieve success, as he felt 
the Italian fascist state had. Henry Ford was 
the most significant "nay-sayer" in industry. 
Clarence Darrow led the fight for small busi-
nessman against the NRA. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1935 in the infamous 
Schechter (Sick Chicken) case found the 
NRA unconstitutional. FDR probably made 
his mind up then to "pack the court," as he 
railed against the decision. In the 
Congressional debate to extend the NRA for 
two years to allow it to clean up after the 
Schechter case, Senator Huey Long of 
Louisiana gave his infamous 16 hour fili-
buster against the extension. 
FDR did not reconstitute the NRA, but 
Congress did provide him with the laws 
needed to maintain the wage/price stability 
that the NRA tried to achieve: (1) the 
Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relation 
Act, put the collective bargaining provisions 
of the NRA into law; (2) the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936 disallowed unjustified 
price cutting to large buyers; (3) the Miller-
Tydings Act in 1937 legalized retail mainte-
nance in interstate commerce; and (4) the 
Fair Labor Standards Act established a mini-
mum wage and maximum work week before 
overtime must be granted. By the late 1930s, 
both the S.E.C. and the American Institute of 
Accountants' Committee on Accounting 
Procedure were issuing promulgations on 
accounting. By the end of the 1930's the 
economy and the country started getting 
ready for war. During World War II, full cost 
plus pricing was back in vogue. In 1942, 
Maurice Peloubet very carefully documented 
these five changes: (a) the influence of the 
S.E.C.; (b) the influence of Revenue Laws; (c) 
the influence of stockholders' requests for 
more information; (d) the influence of an 
expanding national defense and (e) the expec-
tations of the public accountant from cost 
accountants. The Cold War, with its Korean 
Conflict extension, kept demand up in a 
world in which the U.S. was number one. 
The writers posit that the direct cost 
movement of the 1950s and early 1960s had, 
as its root, but unstated cause, dissatisfaction 
with accounting for capacity. If you were a 
"direct coster," you did not have to worry 
about capacity cost allocations, as they were 
avoided. The writers also posit that the view 
of "how many fixed factory overhead vari-
ances can dance on the head of a pin" domi-
nated the rest of the 1960s and 1970s. It was 
only in the early to mid 1980s that accoun-
tants began to be interested again in the 
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engineered based ways of the 1900-1932 
time period. Activity Based Costing and a 
rekindling of interest in "ideal capacity" 
took management accounting to the fore-
front on accounting for capacity matters. 
Hence, the writers claim a "reconnect" was 
made then with realistic accounting for 
capacity and, after about 50 years, manage-
ment accountants were reconnected. 
Vangermeersch and McNair plan to pre-
pare a monograph on this particular theory. 
They solicit comments along the lines of 
Tom Tyson and Dick Fleischman in their 
"The Golden Age of Cost Accounting?: The 
Unfilled Promise of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933." They believe that, at 
the least, doubts have been cast on the old 
and easy answer to the disconnect due to the 
concerns over financial accounting of the 
early 1930s. The writers realize that final 
proof for their point may never be found, but 
audience response and much research appear 
to lend credence to it. Please join them in 
this research quest. 
REFERENCES 
Coit, Margaret L., Mr. Baruch, Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967 
Davis, K.S., FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny, 
1882-1928, Putman, New York, 1972. 
, FDR: The New Deal Years 1933-1937, 
Random House, New York, 1979. 
, FDR: The New Deal Years 1928-1933, 
Random House, New York, 1994. 
Johnson, H .T . and R.S. Kaplan, Relevance 
Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management 
Accounting, Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, 1987. 
McNair, C.J. and R. Vangermeersch, "The 
Gentleman's Club: The NRA and the 
Homogenization of Cost Practices in 
the U.S.," Third Managerial Control 
System Symposium, July 5, 1995, 
London. 
, Measuring the Cost of Capacity, Society of 
Management Accountants of Canada 
and The Institute of Management 
Accountants, MAG #42, Hamilton, 
Ontario, 1996.. 
, "The Tale of Management Accounting: 
The NRA and the Homogenization of 
Cost Practices in the United States," 
Disorder and Harmony: Twentieth Century 
Perspectives of Accounting, Research 
Monograph No. 23, Vancouver, B.C., 
1996. 
, Accounting for the Cost of Capacity: Fast, 
Present, and Future—A Moveable Feast, 
Montvale, NJ: Institute of Management 
Accountants to be published in 1997. 
Peloubet, M.C., "Trends in Accepted 
Accounting and Their Relation to Cost 
Accounting," NACA Bulletin, February 
15, 1942, pp.835-847. 
Ross, C.F., NRA Economic Planning, 
Bloomington, IN, Principia Press, 
1937, Report: New York, DaCapo 
Press, 1971. 
Schwarz, J.A., The New Dealers: Power Politics 
in the Age of Roosevelt, Vintage Books, 
New York, 1994. 
Tyson, T. and R.K. Fleishman, "The 
Golden Age of Cost Accounting?: 
The Unfulfilled Promise of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1933," Academy of Accounting 
Historians Annual Conference, 
Cleveland, OH, 1996. 
* * * 
The Accounting Historians Notebook, April, 1997 11 
Somethimg to think about... 
"A man without mirth is like a wagon without springs, in which one is caused a disagree-
able jolt by every pebble over which it passes." 
—Henry Ward Beecher 
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